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Guinea in 2008: the unfinished revolution
Abstract
Guinea's political transition seems never ending. In 2008, strikes, riots and clashes affected country and
state. In the light of the events of 2006 and 2007, it is a question of interpretation whether the «
revolution » finally came to a close in 2008 or if it is still going on. Within and beyond these
interpretations, the Guinean military play an important but hardly predictable role. However described,
the political scene looks like a paltry theatre and Guinean citizens, tired of political and economic
difficulties, are more and more impatient. 
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Michelle Engeler
Guinea in 2008 : 
the unfinished revolution
Guinea’s political transition seems never ending. In 2008,
strikes, riots and clashes affected country and state.
In the light of the events of 2006 and 2007, it is a ques-
tion of interpretation whether the «revolution» finally
came to a close in 2008 or if it is still going on. Within
and beyond these interpretations, the Guinean military
play an important but hardly predictable role. However
described, the political scene looks like a paltry theatre
and Guinean citizens, tired of political and economic
difficulties, are more and more impatient.
« L’État, c’est moi. Le gouvernement, c’est moi. La justice, c’est moi1. »
The year 2008 has been a turbulent one for Guinean politics 2. To under-
stand the current volatility, one needs to go back to the 2006-2007 events when
a federation of trade unions, the Union syndicale des travailleurs de Guinée
– Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée (USTG-CNTG) called 
for several strikes, proving to be, for the first time since independence, an
effective force for oppositional mobilisation 3. Issues were economic but also
political. Most demonstrations were put down by the military. Some leading
trade unions figures were temporary arrested and mistreated 4. Conté even-
tually accepted the nomination of a Prime minister of consensus, but he
appointed one of his loyal followers, Eugène Camara, in February 2007. The
very same night, violent unrests started ; during the following days, state
buildings were destroyed, civilians and soldiers marauded, and people were
killed as a result of the indiscriminate violence of the security forces. Conté
imposed a state of emergency, which was a call to loot for bandits, militaries
and policemen. Finally, on 26 February, he gave in and appointed Lansana
1. Lansana Conté quoted in « Fin de récréation ? », <www.jeuneafrique.com>, 7 January 2007.
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Kouyaté as his new Prime minister. Kouyaté, a trained diplomat, enjoyed the
support of the trade unions and the Conseil national des organisations de la
société civile guinéenne (CNOSCG). Commenting on these events, International
Crisis Group wrote that « [t]he outcome of the crisis, the appointment of a
head of government from a list put forward by those involved in the social
movement, looked like an exemplary victory for the people over a totally
discredited power – a real revolution » 5. Mike McGovern also optimistically
concluded that, after this victory, « conditions seem propitious for change 
in the middle or long term » 6. Therefore, 2007 had brought about promises of
political change – however, the subsequent events seem to suggest that these
were nothing else than a short interruption in Conté’s style of governing ;
compared with the « February Revolution » of 2007, the events of 2008 seem
to be the inversion of popular power, a presidential counterstrike. This paper
suggests two interpretations of the recent events that might seem, at first
sight, mutually exclusive. The first interpretation proposes that the revolution
failed. The second argues, that the initiated political transformation never-
theless did carry on in 2008, with different means, on different scales and with
different intentions. Within and beyond these two different interpretations
the Guinean military plays an important but hardly predictable role.
The tide of events in 2008
2008 started eventfully for Guinean citizens and political elite alike. With no
prior discussion with Lansana Kouyaté, his Prime Minister since February 2007,
President Conté dismissed his Communication Minister Justin Morel Junior
on the 4th of January 2008. Morel Junior, who had entered the cabinet appointed
by Kouyaté in March 2007, had been involved in the development of more open
media and the expansion of the mobile phone network and he stood as a sym-
bol of the democratisation and its success, however limited. Conté reproached
Morel Junior with failing to ensure that all state media broadcast his end-
of-the-year speech 7. In this address, Conté had called Kouyaté’s government
« a disappointment ». President Conté eventually appointed a new Communi-
cation minister, Issa Condé, a loyal follower of his.
Immediately after the announcement of the dismissal, angry youth blockaded
several streets in Conakry and its suburbs ; stones were thrown at some all-
terrain vehicles, symbols of the « corrupt » elites. Riots and demonstrations
ensued with cries of « No to the return of the old system ! We do not want the
corrupts back 8 ! » The police and military suppressed the demonstrations
brutally, and at least one person was reportedly killed. The following day,
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Conakry was quiet. Many shops remained closed, only a few taxis were on the
road and transport to the interior of the country was largely closed down.
The news spread quickly through the country though, and family and friends
throughout Guinea called Conakry for information. Demonstrations in the
cities of Kankan and Labé followed, and skirmishes apparently took place in
N’Zérékoré. The next day, the USTG-CNTG announced a general strike for 
the 10th of January, demanding negotiations on the political level. Trade unions
warned that Conté’s interference in Kouyaté’s cabinet was against both the letter
and the spirit of the agreement signed in January 2007. They demanded Morel’s
restoration to his position. Kouyaté met with union leaders and civil society
organizations, and trade unions at last called off the strike – more exactly,
they postponed it to the 31st of March.
The next few weeks were given over to bread and games : the national TV
channel Radio Télévision Guinée (RTG) celebrated the new Communication
minister, thanking him for the donation of a generator, henceforth enabling 
RTG to show the games of the Africa Cup of Nations 2008. Electricity was
delivered during the opening football game between Ghana and Guinea in
January, clearly a move to please the youth, some of them sarcastically
commenting that they should talk more about football than about politics 9.
On the anniversary of one of the deadliest days of 2007 protests, Guineans
gathered peacefully in churches and mosques to pray for the victims. In
February and March 2008, rumors circulated that Conté had gone to seek
medical treatment in Switzerland. The difficulties between President Conté 
and Prime minister Kouyaté continued when the latter imprisoned Chantal
Cole, a businesswoman closely related to Conté.
2. This text was finalised at the beginning of December, a few weeks before President Conté died. 
An appendix was attached in January 2008 to cover recent developments. The author wishes 
to thank P. Assef, T. Hagmann, K. Heitz, B. Korf and the three anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments.
3. For background information on the 2006-2007 events, see O. Georg, « Fin de règne sans fin en
Guinée», Le Monde diplomatique,April 2006, p. 15; M. McGovern, «Janvier 2007 – Sékou Touré est mort»,
Politique africaine, n° 107, October 2007, p. 125-145.
4. Conté confronted them with a direct threat : « I am going to kill you all, I am a soldier, I have
already killed people », in International Crisis Group (ICG), Guinea : Change or Chaos, Africa Report,
n° 121, 14 February 2007, p. 7.
5. ICG, Guinea : Change on hold, Africa Briefing n° 49, 8 November 2007, p. 2.
6. M. McGovern, « Janvier 2007… », art. cit., p. 145.
7. « One Conakry, two Lansanas », Africa Confidential, vol. 49, n° 3, 2008, p. 9.
8. Radio France Internationale, «Tensions à Conakry après le limogeage d’un ministre», 5 January 2008.
9. Author’s discussions with four young residents of Conakry, 20 January 2008.
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Some weeks later, trade unions cancelled the strike due at the end of 
March 2008. High prices for rice imports made life during that time increasingly
expensive, and possibly affected popular support for Kouyaté : « we thought
it was Conté who was at the root of our problems and that with the appoint-
ment of Kouyaté, everything would settle. But unfortunately we realize that
neither one of them can deliver happiness », commented one Guinean inter-
viewed by Irin 10.
President Conté interpreted the situation on his own terms and fired Kouyaté
in May, replacing him with Ahmed Tidiane Souaré, who had served as minister
of Mines and Geology (2004-2006) and of Education and Science (2006-2007).
Despite a few demonstrations in localities in Kouyaté’s region of origin and
in some suburbs of Conakry, the situation remained relatively calm. Only a few
days later, the dismissal of the minister of Defence and commander-in-chief
Mamadou Bailo Diallo stirred tension within the armed forces ; shots were
reported around barracks in Conakry and in the country.
President Conté went on dismissing officials throughout the year, to such
an extent he seems to have lost track, appointing different persons to the same
office at nearly the same time. Guinean observers took this as a sign of an
ongoing « battle of elephants » fought between the competing clans in Conté’s
entourage, as well as an indication of « the President’s lack of control over
the situation » 11.
Following the civil unrests in early 2007, transparent, democratic elections
had been agreed. For that reason, a Commission électorale nationale indé-
pendante (Ceni) was established. With support of the UN Development
Program and the EU, elections were originally scheduled for June 2007, but 
were repeatedly delayed – in November 2008, they were once more delayed
to 2009 or even 2010, with the then-Prime minister Ahmed Tidiane Souaré
arguing that elections could not be held until a broader « national consen-
sus » had been built 12.
Throughout the rest of the year, different trade-unions launched sectorial,
small-scale strikes. Riots broke out in various cities, in protest against the lack
of basic services such as electricity and water. The latter were mostly organized
by malcontent youth and often resulted in clashes with the security forces. 
No surprise, then, that Guineans kept expressing their concern for the state of
current political affairs 13.
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Failed revolution…
One way of reading the situation is to see recent political developments in
Guinea as a « failed revolution ». According to this view, President Conté never
changed his political behaviour, his style of ruling. As early as June 2007,
Conté said in an interview, « I am the boss, the others are my subordinates »14,
a clear sign that, for him, nothing had changed. The sacking of various ministers
reflects this attitude as well as his capacity to bide his time ; Conté dismissed
Kouyaté as soon as he lost the support of the trade unions and the population.
International Crisis Group concluded accordingly that, « Conté assumes his
irresponsibility so well that he has ended up convincing many of his fellow
citizens that he can be both head of state and completely irresponsible » 15.
Accusations of policy failure were almost automatically directed towards
Kouyaté and his government, and Conté charateristically declared, «[it] is a good
thing to have a Prime minister to take the blows instead of the president » 16.
A number of other central episodes support the « failed revolution » inter-
pretation. One of them is that, although ex-Prime minister Kouyaté had
promised to build up a government with new faces in March 2007, many
senior civil servants from the old administration found important positions in
the new administration, particularly as préfets or governors 17. In addition,
Conté’s former ministers met regularly throughout, and it appears that they
successfully organized resistance to the shifts initiated by political opposition
groups and trade union leaders. The eventual take over of Ahmed Tidjane
Souaré, a loyal follower of President Conté, as Prime minister is a sign of Conté’s
success in bringing the old guard back in. Power therefore remained unequally
distributed because Conté and his entourage continued to pull the strings.
Furthermore, President Conté remained the constitutional leader of Guinea ;
he had to sign all decrees and could thus easily stall government action. 
One should also recall that the position of Prime minister is not mentioned 
in the constitution and any incumbent has only the powers that the President
10. Irin, « End of fuel subsidy increases economic woes », 1 April 2008.
11. A. T. Camara, «Comment Lansana Conté fragilise ses Premiers ministres!», <www.guineenews.org>,
3 August 2008.
12. See Irin, « Guinea : Political players differ over further election delays », 5 December 2008.
13. Author’s conversations in Conakry, October 2008.
14. Agence France-Presse, « Je suis le chef, les autres sont mes subordonnés », 15 June 2007.
15. ICG, Guinea : Change…, op. cit., p. 8.
16. Agence France-Presse, « Je suis le chef… », art. cit.
17. ICG, Guinea : Change…, op. cit., p. 10.
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delegates to him. Behind the scenes, different actors have been influencing 
the President, especially his four wives and their respective coteries. All of 
them try to consolidate their influence on the « old man » and they do not act
in isolation, but in complex networks of kin, ethnic relations and business
connections.
However, the weaknesses of Kouyaté and his cabinet were not solely the
result of the influence of President Conté and his entourage, and Kouyaté 
did come under the criticism of those involved in the movement for change.
He was for instance reproached with favoring his ethnic clientele, the Mandinka
group. Thus, in an open letter to the Prime minister, the trade union leaders
insisted that appointments at the Central bank, the préfectures and governor-
ships had been made on the basis of « kinship » rather than competence 18.
This letter signaled that the « February revolutionaries » were no longer in
full agreement. Kouyaté’s difficulties in bringing trade-unions, civil society orga-
nizations and political parties to the negotiating table in January 2008 were a
result of these growing disagreements and a proof of his inability to launch 
a real national dialogue about the future of Guinea. Only through such a
dialogue could he have put the responsibility of economic and political change
on different shoulders, gained real legitimacy and avoided his dismissal 
in May 2008. A famous anecdote illustrates how Kouyaté increasingly came
to be seen : his decision to build the statue of an elephant built on the Dixinn-
Hamdalaye road, in Conakry, in January 2008, officially as a gesture of support
for the national football team during the Africa Cup of Nations, was widely
seen as a sign of an ethnocentrist attempt to restore the image of Sékou Touré
and his Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) – like Kouyaté, Touré hails from
the ethnic Mandinka group and the PDG’s regalia had been an elephant 19.
Trade-unions were part of the problems facing Kouyaté, too : after the
events of 2006 and 2007, their leaders found themselves heading a mass move-
ment increasingly political in nature. In January 2008 trade-unions were not
able to alter the analogies of possible strikes with violent and dangerous
demonstrations ; different government officials compared the strikes with 
«war» ; some called it an «atomic bomb», to be launched by the trade unions20.
Popular fear of uncontrollable marauding demonstrators grew accordingly 
and they lost the support they had long enjoyed.
When President Conté replaced Kouyaté with Souaré, trade union represen-
tatives were shocked. One of their leaders, Ibrahima Fofana, said, « We do
not understand how the president could have chosen one of the old guard »21.
But disagreements within trade unions weakened their position and signs of
internal divisions were manifest during an all-day meeting of the union leaders
in Conakry on 22 May 2008. A member of a union based in the provincial
92 CONJONCTURE
02. conjoncture 112  10/02/09  12:33  Page 92
Politique africaine 
Guinea in 2008 : the unfinished revolution93
capital of Kindia said, « Even if the secretary-generals of the unions don’t
want to go on strike, we, the union members do » 22. But finally, no strikes
have been reported.
… or unfinished revolution ?
The current situation in Guinea could also be interpreted as a slow, but
steady march towards political change and durable democratization. During
the « February Revolution », Guineans demonstrated their enthusiasm and
desire for political reforms, that is an accountable president and a democratic
system with a Prime minister, who would be more than the president’s jumping
jack. Writing soon after, Mike McGovern optimistically commented that the
Guinean population was ready for political change for the better 23. The main
actors or initiators of these political transformations, he observed, were the trade
unions, standing for a political alternative rather than for a simple replacement
of the old guard by a new generation from the same elite. Additionally, the vote
of the National assembly against the prolongation of the state of exception 
in February 2007 could be read as a sign of internal shifts within the entourage
of President Conté. Therefore there have been shifts within and beyond the 
old-established power elite.
After the events of 2007, trade unions established new local branches and
gained new members, building up support throughout the country, thus
creating a level of political awareness beyond ethnic affiliations. Therefore, while
opposition parties are often seen as strongly related to ethnic groups 24, trade
unions are seen as much closer to «national» ideas. The various, smaller strikes
of 2008 can also be seen as a continuation of the revolutionary momentum of
2007. Thus, the teachers’ union went on strike in June 2008, asking among
others for compliance with the decrees taken in January and February 2007 
for the modernization of the education system and for salary increases 25. 
18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. A. Bakr, « Asanavie à belle-vue, syli so tai… », Le Lynx, n° 824, January 2008, p. 3.
20. Author’s interviews, Conakry, 8-10 January 2008. 
21. See Irin, « Guinea : appointment of new PM “violates” union agreement », 23 May 2008.
22. See Irin, « Guinea : Appointment… », art. cit.
23. M. McGovern, « Janvier 2007… », art. cit.
24. Ibid., p. 128 ; P. Chambers, « Guinée. Le prix d’une stabilité à court terme », Politique africaine, n° 94,
June 2004, p. 130.
25. N. Baldé, «Après les militaires, les enseignants “réclament” des sous : une autre grève est annoncée
à partir du 19 juin », <www.guineenews.org>, 10 June 2008.
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In August and September 2008, most of the health care workers shut down
medical provision in and around Conakry, asking for back pay, salary increase
and promotions 26. Therefore, trade unions have continued to impact politics
and their politicisation did persist, even though on a different scale – the 2008
protests only included several minor groups in different strikes and did not
have the same impact on the interior as nation-wide strikes in 2007.
Along with these «regular» strikes, mostly young people carried on demon-
strating during 2008. On the evenings of 8 and 9 September 2008, different
boroughs of Conakry were barricaded by youth protesting against month-
long electricity blackouts 27. On 3 November 2008 again, roads were blocked
with logs and burning tyres in protest against high fuel prices – as a result,
public transport operated on reduced levels and shops remained closed in
Guinea’s capital. In the interior, people were no calmer. For example in Novem-
ber 2008, residents of Boké, protesting against the lack of basic services in
their communities, blocked the railway, the central transport link for mining
companies 28. Altogether the Guinean people’s struggle for political change 
has gone on and Guineans have time and again expressed their grievances.
At the outset of 2008, Kouyaté said « We have changed the ways of doing
things» and, elsewhere, «Guinea is on the move»29. On both the economic and
political fronts, he was optimistic. At that time, he claimed that disagreements
with President Conté were under control and that negotiations with the leaders
of the political opposition and other key actors were going on. Despite the
subsequent changes and Conté’s removal of opposition ministers, the events
of 2007 had indeed opened of political dialogue of a kind, which included
different stakeholders. Therefore, parties, trade unions and civil society
organizations jointly agreed on the postponement of the important legislative
elections.
Economically, the discovery of uranium in the forest region and of possible
offshore oil reserves in 2007 fostered the interest of international corporations
in Guinea. Several mining conventions were organized in 2008 and seemed 
to promise economic improvements and political progress. International actors
remained involved, e. g. financially support the preparation and realization 
of the legislative elections.
Beyond and within : the military
Not only the different trade unions launched small-scale strikes, the military
did not keep quiet either. In May 2008 soldiers demanding the pay-offs
promised by ex-Prime minister Kouyaté started rioting in three military camps
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across Conakry. They entered a four-day standoff with the loyalist presidential
guard during which 101 people were injured and 2 killed. The army has long
demanded the settlement of unpaid salaries – in May 2007 militaries had gone
on a looting spree in Conakry and other garrison towns. In May 2008 dis-
agreements erupted between different units and ranks of the Guinean army,
opposing powerful loyalist units like the presidential guard (Bérets rouges),
the gendarmerie and members of the Compagnie mobile d’intervention et de
sécurité (Cmis), a police force, to disorganized and badly trained infantry
troops. Disagreements between older and younger army members added
further fuel. Accordingly, some younger military officers demanded that all top
commanders from the armed forces be discharged. This ambivalent situation
within the security forces causes uncertainty and fear among the population.
At the same time, they were seen as nearly the only force in a position to bring
to an end Conté’s unpopular regime : « if the military wants to get rid of
President Conté, they can do it, but they shouldn’t involve us and they should
do it without violence », said one Guinean interviewed by Irin 30. However,
following talks in May 2008, the government agreed to pay outstanding
salaries. Furthermore, the president granted promotions. Two weeks after the
soldiers’ protest, policemen started demonstrating in the Guinean capital over
back pay. Soldiers were sent to fight these police strikers, shots were fired
and casualties were reported on both sides. The clash between the military 
and the police was strongly criticized by the population, a commentator on a
popular Internet page calling it an indicator of the « death » of the Guinean
state 31. Furthermore discussions on the loyalty of the military proceeded. « Les
enfants de Conté », as Guinean citizens often call militaries, have often been
seen as loyal only to Conté’s ethnic group, the Soussou, out of which most are
popularly seen to come from 32. Indeed, one analyst has been so far as to
describe the Guinean army as an « ethnic gang docilely serving General
Lansana Conté and the Soussou-dominated elite » 33. This statement is a bit
26. See Irin, « Guinea : Medical services paralysed for day two of health strike », 9 September 2008.
27. See Irin, « Guinea : Youths pledge continued demonstrations until lights come on », 10 Septem-
ber 2008 ; Irin, « Guinea : Strike suspended, health workers back on job », 18 September 2008.
28. See Irin, « Guinea : mining communities will not let up “despite repression” », 4 November 2008.
29. C. Y. Seck, Interview Lansana Kouyate, Jeune Afrique, n° 2450-2451, 23 December 2007 – 5 January 2008,
p. 95-96.
30. See Irin, « Guinea : Mutinous soldiers stand down after pay-off », 30 May 2008.
31. M. I. Sory, « La disparition évidente de l’État guinéen », <www.aminata.com>, 10 July 2008.
32. Author’s conversation in Conakry, 1 October 2008.
33. M. S. Camara, « From military politization to militarization of power in Guinea-Conakry », Journal
of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 28, 2000, p. 324.
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excessive, though there is no doubt that ethnic affiliation plays an important
role within the networks that structure the armed forces. Still, the recent
mutinies have undoubtedly complexified the situation within the armed
forces, possibly weakening the grasp of the Soussou.
Further current military issues are the border conflicts with neighbouring
Sierra Leone in the Forest Region. Since 1998 Guinean military troops have 
been positioned in the city of Yenga, which is disputed between Guinea 
and Sierra Leone 34. In October 2008 the situation there deteriorated and the
Freetown authorities demanded the return of Yenga to Sierra Leone by 200935.
The town lies on a frequently travelled road between Sierra Leone and Guinea,
and is a booming market place, especially for drugs 36. Several hundred
Guinean troops with tanks and heavy weapons are said to guard this extra-
state market. A clash between Guinean and Sierra Leonean soldiers is not
impossible and could destabilize the border region, the basis for a longer-
term problem for the Guinean state.
Therefore, the Guinean army, with its different units, ethnic affiliations,
and political and economic entanglements, plays an important but opaque role.
On several occasions during 2008, rumours of a military coup spread in
Conakry and the country. Indeed, such a coup seems quite possible, though
its leaders could belong either to the old guard or pursuers of « revolution ».
The 2007 « February Revolution » and the ensuing government reshuffle
and power struggles initially suggested that Guinea was undergoing funda-
mental political change. At the time of writing (end of November 2008), the
situation appears much more ambiguous : Conté’s political counterstrike
seems to have succeeded, and the political alternative has failed. The promised
transformations did not completely stop however : trade unions are still key
actors and mobilise efficiently. And the youth have not stopped protesting
and complaining about their unsatisfactory living conditions. These are,
indeed, signs of an unfinished revolution. However, riots – tumultuous clashes
rather more than coordinated strikes – give rise to fears and uncertainties not
only for the residents in Conakry. President Conté, who was born in the 1930s,
is seriously ill ; his appearance on the occasion of Independence Day attested
to his poor health. But his succession remains undecided. What actors will play
the leading roles is difficult to say yet. Right now it seems to be the old guard
and/or the army. The latter, shaked as it has been by the recent mutinies, 
will be unpredictable and could easily destabilize the country. However, the
increasing grievances of Guinean citizens also suggest that parts of the popu-
lation could follow a charismatic leader and fight for political transformations.
It is hard to say who this leader could be. Events of the past years have shown
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that it was trade union leaders with a national, not ethnic, and not the opposition
parties who could mobilize the population. In any case, the forthcoming
legislative elections will be as crucial as the orientation of the army and regional
and social dynamics  !
Michelle Engeler
University of Zurich
Appendix – 12 January 2009
On the evening of the 22 December 2008, after 24 years in power, President
Lansana Conté passed away – it seems as if only death could remove Conté,
after all, an indication of his uncanny mastery of Guinean politics. Only 
hours later, on the 23, a group of militaries took power in a bloodless coup. 
The military junta, organised in a Conseil national pour la démocratie et le
développement (CNDD), announced the dissolution of the government. The
day after, the CNDD declared they had chosen (by lot) Captain Moussa Dadis
Camara as their leader. On the very same day, Camara declared himself 
the new President of the country. A week after the coup, he appointed as 
the new Prime minister Kabiné Komara, a banker who had been among the
nominees of the trade unions in 2007. President Camara quickly vowed to
hold presidential elections in 2010, insisting he would not run for office.
While few figures of the political opposition have taken a public stand so
far, Guinean trade union and civil society leaders seem to perceive the newly
installed military junta as the best chance for change – the nomination of
Komara has clearly been a gesture in their direction37. To this day, no demon-
strations, clashes or gunshots have been reported. Nevertheless, two weeks after
the coup, several high-ranking officers, including the former head of staff of
the armed forces, General Diarra Camara, were arrested 38, apparently under
34. Colonial or pre-colonial demarcations legitimize each country’s claims. Author’s interview in
Conakry, October 2008.
35. I. Tarawallie, « Koroma, Conté, Sirleaf to discuss Yenga », <www.allAfrica.com>, 23 October 2008.
36. Author’s interview in Conakry, October 2008.
37. See Irin, « Guinea : Civil society looks to junta for break from past », 30 December 2008.
38. Y. B. Sylla, « Exclusif : plusieurs officiers supérieurs arrêtés par la junte militaire ! »,
<www.guineenews.org>, 6 January 2008.
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suspicion that they were planning a counter-coup. The former head of staff of
the armed forces, General Diarra Camara, was detained.
As has lately become the norm with coups in Africa, international organi-
sations have condemned the CNDD’s take over, and Guinean authorities have
been suspended from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)
and the African Union (AU). Most of the neighboring countries expressed
their concern with the developments in Guinea, but President Wade of Senegal
expressed his full support for the new president and the military junta. The
EU (including France) said it would not suspend aid but asked for elections
to be held as soon as possible. The United States suspended assistance outside
of humanitarian aid and programs supporting the democratic process. 
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, the new Guinean president, is 44-year old,
a Christian from the minority Guerze/Kpelle ethnic group, from the Guinée
forestière (préfecture of Lola). He joined the Guinean army in the 1990s and 
was trained in Germany 39. Under suspicion of a coup attempt, he was jailed
for some time in the mid-2000s, which made him a popular man among the
lower ranking soldiers who were key in the mutinies of 2007 and 2008. It is 
still difficult to understand the dynamics behind the coup. Captain Dadis
Camara certainly has an outsider profile : his age and junior rank confirm that
the military hierarchies have been muddled over the last years, and he has
publicly marked his dislike of General Diarra Camara, a close associate of
Conté. A new generation might be on the rise, at least in the armed forces, and
it is encouraging that trade union leaders seem positive about Captain Camara.
But his entourage, the workings of the CNDD and its connections to the many
segments of Conté’s old guard, but also to opposition politicians, are not
known – it is thus not clear whether the CNDD can initiate a real political
alternative. The coup confirms, if need be, that power in Guinea lies with the
armed forces. 
2008 ended up being the last year of President Conté’s resilient regime.
Conté’s rather successful political counter-attack left a rather confused scene,
and the military stepped in. It remains to be seen whether the legislative and
presidential elections that have been announced will take place, how the issue
of ethnicity will fare in this new situation and whether they will stimulate the
political scene and prevent the routinisation of a new military regime.
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